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Abstract—Tor is vulnerable to network-level adversaries who
can observe both ends of the communication to deanonymize
users. Recent work has shown that Tor is susceptible to the
previously unknown active BGP routing attacks, called RAPTOR
attacks, which expose Tor users to more network-level adver-
saries. In this paper, we aim to mitigate and detect such active
routing attacks against Tor. First, we present a new measurement
study on the resilience of the Tor network to active BGP prefix
attacks. We show that ASes with high Tor bandwidth can be less
resilient to attacks than other ASes. Second, we present a new
Tor guard relay selection algorithm that incorporates resilience
of relays into consideration to proactively mitigate such attacks.
We show that the algorithm successfully improves the security
for Tor clients by up to 36% on average (up to 166% for certain
clients). Finally, we build a live BGP monitoring system that
can detect routing anomalies on the Tor network in real time by
performing an AS origin check and novel detection analytics. Our
monitoring system successfully detects simulated attacks that are
modeled after multiple known attack types as well as a real-world
hijack attack (performed by us), while having low false positive
rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tor network [1] has been the most widely used system
for anonymous communication that protects users’ identities
from untrusted parties who have access to user traffic. Tor
serves millions of users and carries terabytes of traffic every
day with its network of over 7,000 relays [2]. This makes Tor
a popular target for adversaries who wish to compromise the
anonymity of the users.
Tor is vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks. An adversary
who can observe the traffic at both ends of the communication
path (i.e., between the Tor client and the entry relay, and
between the exit relay and the destination server) can perform
traffic analysis on packet sizes and timings to deanonymize the
Tor users [3], [4]. Network-level adversaries, i.e., autonomous
systems (ASes), that lie on the path between a Tor client and
an entry relay, and between an exit relay and the destination
server can deanonymize Tor clients [5]–[7]. More recently, re-
searchers have further exploited the dynamics of BGP routing
to propose the new RAPTOR attacks [8], which exaggerate
this threat by enabling more network-level adversaries to be at
a compromising position, including active BGP prefix attacks
which were not previously studied on Tor.
Building countermeasures to defend Tor against such mali-
cious AS-level adversaries is an important challenge facing our
community. Past work has explored AS-aware relay selection
algorithms that minimize the chance of selecting Tor relays
with the same AS lying on both ends of the communication
paths [5], [9], [10]. However, these works focus on mitigating
passive attacks in which AS-level adversaries only passively
observe traffic instead of launching any active attacks. These
observations motivate our work on developing countermea-
sures against such active BGP attacks on Tor.
First, we quantify the vulnerability of the current Tor
network to active BGP prefix hijack and interception attacks.
Second, we develop a novel Tor guard relay selection al-
gorithm which incorporates AS resilience of Tor relays and
proactively protects Tor clients from being affected by such
attacks. Finally, we present a live BGP monitoring system on
the Tor network that can detect routing anomalies in real time.
To summarize, we make the following three contributions:
Measurement on the Tor network. In order to understand
the importance of the threat and inspire defenses against the
active routing attacks, we first measure the vulnerability of the
current Tor network. Based on the current Internet topology
[11] and Tor consensus data [12], we adapt an AS-resilience
metric [13] to measure resilience of the Tor network to BGP
hijack attacks. Next, we develop a novel extension of the
metric to analyze interception attack scenarios and measure
resilience to interception attacks launched by Tier 1 ASes.
Our key findings are:
• Some ASes that have high Tor bandwidth have low
resiliences to hijack attacks, e.g., AS 16276 (OVH),
which contains 339 Tor relays and only has a resilience
value of 0.408 on a scale of [0, 1], indicating that in a
hijack event, the probability of a Tor client (who uses
relays in this AS) being deceived is close to 60%. The
cause of this lies in the topological features of the ASes
in the AS hierarchy.
• ASes have higher resiliences to interception attacks.
However, some ASes (e.g., OVH) with high Tor relay
bandwidth still have relatively low resilience (e.g., OVH
has resilience 0.56 while the average is 0.8).
• AS resilience varies depending on client location, and
has high heterogeneity. For instance, OVH has resilience
>= 0.8 for 20% of the client ASes, while <= 0.3 for
another 20% of the client ASes.
Proactive approach against active BGP attacks. We propose
and implement a novel Tor guard relay selection algorithm,
which considers a resilience metric for ASes and protects the
connection between Tor clients and Tor guard relay. Our guard
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relay selection algorithm is the first algorithm to incorporate
resilience to active BGP routing attacks on Tor [8] and the first
countermeasure to proactively protect Tor clients from being
affected by such attacks. The algorithm combines resilience
and bandwidth into relay selection to ensure security as well as
performance. Our evaluation shows that the algorithm achieves
up to 36% improvement on average (up to 166% for certain
clients) in probability of Tor clients being resilient to a prefix
hijack attack on guard relay and improves the anonymity
bounds (computed by MATor [14]) compared to the current
Tor relay selection algorithm. At the same time, it only suffers
minimal performance loss based on a large-scale evaluation on
the Shadow emulator.
Reactive approach against active BGP attacks. To com-
plement our proactive defense, we build and deploy a live
monitoring system that monitors routing activities for Tor
relays in real time. The monitoring system uses the real-
time BGP routing information in addition to novel analytics-
based hijack detection methods. The system collects live BGP
updates from BGP Stream [15], as well as the latest hourly Tor
consensus data, and detects suspicious prefix announcements
(affecting the Tor network) by performing AS origin check
and analytics in real time. Our evaluation shows that most
BGP updates that involve a Tor relay are only announced
by a single AS (across all updates). Our detection analytics
have a low false positives rate of 0.19% on average. We also
show that both the live AS origin check and the analytics
successfully detected simulated attacks that are modeled after
multiple known attack types as well as a real-world BGP
hijack attack (performed by us). The monitoring system will
help enhance the transparency of the Tor network with regards
to active BGP attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief overview of background and related work on Tor. Section
3 describes the metrics used to measure the resilience of
Tor network to active BGP hijack/interception attacks and
presents the results. Section 4 presents our new Tor guard
relay selection algorithm and evaluation. Section 5 shows
our design for the live monitoring system and describes our
deployment experience. Section 6 provides discussions on the
current approaches and directions for future work. Finally, we
conclude in Section 7.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Here we discuss network-level adversaries on the Tor net-
work and past work on defending against such network-level
adversaries.
A. Network Adversaries on Tor
Feamster and Dingledine [6] first investigated AS-level
adversaries in anonymity networks, and they showed that some
ASes could appear on nearly 30% of entry-exit pairs, although
the anonymity networks have grown significantly since then.
Murdoch and Zielinski [16] later demonstrated the threat posed
by network-level adversaries who can deanonymize users by
performing traffic analysis. Furthermore, Edman and Syverson
[5] demonstrated that even given the explosive growth of
Tor during the past years, still about 18% of Tor circuits
result in a single AS being able to observe both ends of the
communication path. In 2013, Johnson et al. [7] evaluated
the security of Tor users over a period of time, and the
results indicated that a network-level adversary with just low-
bandwidth cost/budget could deanonymize any user within
three months with over 50% probability and within six months
with over 80% probability.
While all prior research, to our knowledge, focuses on
passive adversaries, more recently, Sun et al. [8] proposed a
new suite of attacks, called RAPTOR attacks, that discovered
the threat posed by active AS-level adversaries who can
perform active BGP routing attacks to put themselves onto the
path between client-entry and/or exit-destination. The paper
also showed that these routing attacks have occurred on the
Tor network. Using past BGP data, they demonstrated that Tor
relays were affected in prefix hijack attacks. For example, in
the Indosat hijack in 2014 [17], among the victim prefixes
there were 44 Tor relays, and 33 of them were guard relays
which had direct connections with Tor clients.
B. Defenses against Network Adversaries
The existence of network-level adversaries motivates the
research on AS-awareness in path selection in Tor. In 2012,
Akhoondi et al. [9] proposed LASTor, a Tor client that takes
into account AS-level path and relay locations in selecting
a path; our work differs by considering relays’ resilience to
active attacks and relays’ capacity. Recently, Nithyanand et
al. [10] constructed a new Tor client, Astoria, which adopted
a new path selection algorithm that considered more aspects
- relay capacity, asymmetric routing, and colluding ASes.
Barton et al. [18] also proposed a destination-naive AS-aware
path selection, DeNASA, which avoided a list of suspect ASes
when constructing circuits in advance. However, both Astoria
and DeNASA only considers passive AS-level attackers and
does not consider the case of active routing attacks.
Most recently, Tan et al. [19] proposed a data-plane de-
tection approach that periodically runs traceroute to detect
longest-prefix attacks and update Tor relay descriptors upon
anomaly detection, so that Tor users can pick guard relays cor-
respondingly. Unfortunately, this approach cannot proactively
protect Tor users who have already established connections
with Tor guard relays which are under attack, and furthermore,
the detection is not in real time - the periodic nature of
traceroutes and hourly update of Tor consensus will both lead
to delays in detection while the attacks may be short-lived (Sun
et al. [8] show that deanonymization accuracy can reach 90%
by performing a longest-prefix attack for less than 5 minutes).
Thus, these observations motivate our work on developing
countermeasures that can proactively defend Tor users against
active routing attacks, as well as a live monitoring system that
can detect attacks on Tor in real time.
C. Resilience to Active Routing Attacks
Lad et al. [13] investigated the relationship between Internet
topology and prefix hijacking, and provided a metric for
evaluating AS resilience to active prefix hijack attacks. While
the study provides a foundational starting point for our work,
it was conducted in 2007 when there were far fewer ASes
than today and it only simulated a partial attack scenario
of 1000 randomly selected ASes as attackers. Furthermore,
it is not specific to the Tor network. In comparison to this
work, we first adapt the metric to measure resilience of Tor to
active hijack attacks, considering all attack scenarios as well as
weighted attack scenarios based on top Tor client locations. We
then devise a novel extension to evaluate resilience to active
interception attacks. In Section IV, we incorporate the AS
resilience metric into the Tor guard relay selection algorithm.
III. MEASURING TOR’S CURRENT STATE OF RESILIENCE
TO BGP HIJACK AND INTERCEPTION ATTACKS
Network-level adversaries can launch BGP routing attacks
by announcing BGP prefixes that they do not own. Over
the past years, several well known attacks that affected large
portions of the Internet [17], [20]–[23] continuously show us
the high vulnerability of BGP. The Tor network is no exception
– more than 90% of BGP prefixes hosting Tor relays have
prefix length shorter than /24, making them vulnerable to
more-specific prefix attacks [8]. However, the prevalence of
equally-specific attacks and how these attacks affect Tor relays
have not been well studied. This type of hijack attack tends to
be more stealthy because unlike more-specific prefix attacks,
equally-specific attacks may not be seen by all vantage points.
Furthermore, interception attacks which are more relevant for
traffic analysis can only be equally-specific attacks, which
we will explain in Section III-C. First, we show in a case
study that the Tor network has been affected by equally-
specific attacks in past real-world hijacks. Second, we look
at how to evaluate the Tor network in terms of susceptibility
to equally-specific hijack and interception attacks. These steps
help quantify how vulnerable the Tor network is to real
world network-level adversaries and also provide insights for
developing countermeasures.
A. Motivation: Equally-Specific Prefix Attacks on Tor
Tor relays have already been affected in past known BGP
attacks [8]. As a motivating example, we consider the Indosat
2014 hijack [17], which affected the most number of Tor relays
among all the attacks. The 44 Tor relays that were hijacked
belonged to 23 prefixes. We found that all these 23 prefixes
were announced by the false origin, Indosat (ASN 4761), in
the same length as were announced by their true origin ASes.
Table I shows the prefix lengths of the 23 prefixes. We can
see that equally-specific attacks are a real threat. Note that
equally-specific attack is a shorter path attack, as the traffic
will go to the false origin AS only when its path is shorter
(or, more preferred) than the path to the true origin AS.
Prefix Length 13 14 16 18 19 20 21 23 24
# of Prefixes 3 1 3 1 1 2 5 2 5
TABLE I: Prefix lengths of prefixes that cover Tor relays, and
were affected in Indosat 2014 hijack. All of these prefixes
were attacked by equally-specific prefix hijacks.
B. Resilience to prefix hijack attacks
When an adversary announces an equally-specific BGP
prefix to hijack the traffic, some ASes would be deceived by
the false announcement and thus send traffic to the false origin
AS (adversary) instead of the true origin AS. Previous work
has studied how many, and which, ASes are affected by prefix
hijack attacks using simulations of the entire Internet [13]. We
build off this work by adapting the AS resilience metric to the
Tor network, by considering all attack scenarios as well as
weighted attack scenarios based on top Tor client locations.
1) Definition of resilience: We first define the term re-
silience. A source AS v is resilient to a hijack attack launched
by a false origin AS a on a true origin AS t, if v is not deceived
by a and still sends its traffic to t.
• The origin-source-attacker resilience of a particular true
origin AS t with a given source AS v and attacking
AS a, is defined as the probability of v being resilient
and thus is always in the interval of [0, 1]. For instance,
an origin-source-attacker resilience value of 0.4 indicates
40% probability of v being resilient to the attack (or, 60%
probability of being deceived).
• The origin-source resilience of a particular true origin AS
t with a given source AS v is defined as the probability of
v being resilient if any other ASes launch a prefix attack
on t.
• The origin resilience of a particular true origin AS t,
with a given target set of source ASes (e.g., all existing
ASes or top ASes containing Tor clients), is defined as
the averaged probability of the source ASes in the target
set being resilient if any other ASes launch a prefix attack
on t.
In the following sub-sections, we show the detailed steps to
calculate such resilience values of the ASes in the Tor network.
2) AS path prediction: In order to compute the probability
of a source AS being resilient/deceived, we first need to predict
its AS-level paths to both the false origin AS and true origin
AS of destination. Gao et al. have shown that AS level paths
are determined mainly based on two preferences [24]: (1)
Local Preference: customer route is preferred over peer route,
which is preferred over provider route; (2) Shortest Path:
Among paths with the highest local preference, paths with
the shortest hops will be preferred.
Furthermore, the AS paths should also have the valley free
property [25]. Thus, we use breadth first search to traverse the
graph from a given source node based on this property and the
preferences. We first explore provider-customer paths, which
are the most preferred; next, we explore one peer-to-peer path
followed by a sequence of provider-customer paths, which are
the next preferred; finally, we explore customer-provider paths
followed by an optional peer-to-peer path and then followed by
a sequence of provider-customer paths. Nodes are explored in
the most preferred to least preferred order, and those which are
explored in the same step are equally preferred. This ordering
will help accelerate the resilience calculation.
3) Origin-source-attacker resilience for given (t, v, a):
Next, given the AS-level paths, we will then compute the
probability of a source AS v being resilient to the attack. If
the best path from the source AS v to the true origin t is
more preferred than the best path to the false origin a, then
the resilience would be 1; in the opposite case when it is
less preferred, the resilience would be 0. If they’re equally
preferred, the probability will be computed as follows:
β¯(t, v, a) =
p(v, t)
p(v, t) + p(v, a)
(1)
where p(v, a) is the number of equally preferred paths from
node v to false origin a and p(v, t) is the number of equally
preferred paths from node v to true origin t.
4) Origin resilience: With the origin-source-attacker re-
siliences of each (t, v, a) tuple, we can first compute the
origin-source resilience of an origin AS t for each source
AS v in the target set, by aggregating the origin-source-
attacker resiliences of all attacking ASes (representing all
attack scenarios which can be launched by any AS a). Then,
we can compute origin resilience of the origin AS t by further
aggregating the origin-source resiliences of the source ASes in
the target set. The following equation illustrates the resilience
computation when the target set of source ASes equals to the
set of all ASes.
R(t) =
∑
a∈N
∑
v∈N
β¯(t, v, a)
(N − 1)(N − 2) (2)
where N is the set of all ASes and N is the total number
of ASes.
We adapt the above metric to Tor by measuring the origin
resilience of each AS that contains at least one Tor relay.
Algorithm 1 shows the detailed steps to calculate the origin-
source resilience for each Tor-related AS t from a given
source/client AS v. The origin resilience for each Tor-related
AS t can then be computed by aggregating over the target
set of source/client ASes. In Section III-D, we illustrate the
results when (1) the target set is the set of all ASes, and (2)
the target set is the set of top 95 Tor client ASes [7].
C. Resilience to prefix interception attacks
Next, we derive a new extension of the metric to measure
the resilience of Tor-related ASes to prefix interception attacks.
Launching a prefix interception attack requires one further
step than prefix hijack attacks - the false origin AS needs to
forward the hijacked traffic back to the true origin AS. Note
that interception attacks can only happen with equally-specific
prefix attacks; otherwise, if it’s a more-specific prefix attack,
the whole internet would be affected and the false origin AS
Algorithm 1 Origin-source resilience to hijacks for Tor-related
ASes from a source AS v.
function CALCHIJACKRESILIENCE(graph G, node v)
CALCPATHSFROMNODE(G, v)
R[t] = 0 ∀ Tor AS t
for each reachable node i from node v do
if node i contains Tor relays then
n← num. of nodes with less preferred paths than node
i
R[i] ← n +∑a∈A β¯(i, v, a) where A is the set of
nodes with equally-preferred paths as node i
end if
end for
N ← num. of nodes in G
return [R[i]/(N − 2) for each node i in R]
end function
would not be able to route the traffic back to the true origin.
Prior work [26], [27] has pointed out that to be able to do this,
the false origin AS needs to satisfy a safety condition: none of
the ASes along the existing route from false origin AS to true
origin AS should choose the invalid route advertised by the
false origin AS, and thus the false origin AS can still use its
existing route to forward the hijacked traffic back to the true
origin. Thus, when making the invalid route announcement,
there are two cases to consider: (1) if the false origin AS’s
existing route to the true origin AS is through a peer or
customer route, then it’s safe to make the false announcement
to all its neighbors without affecting its existing route to the
true origin; (2) if the false origin AS’s existing route to the
true origin AS is through a provider route, then it can only
make the false announcement to its peers and customers, but
not providers.
Based on the above property, we modify Algorithm 1 to
the following Algorithm 2 to evaluate resilience to interception
attacks.
D. Hijack Resilience Results
We obtained the list of Tor relays from the Tor consensus
data on January 1, 2016 and retrieved their corresponding
ASes. Then, we downloaded the AS topology published by
CAIDA in January 2016. The AS topology contains 52,838
ASes, in which 1,185 ASes contain a total of 6,942 Tor
relays. We first considered all possible hijacking scenarios
(any AS can be a potential attacker and the Tor client can
be located in any AS) against each of the 1,185 Tor-related
ASes, totaling 52, 837× 1, 185 = 62, 611, 845 prefix hijacks.
We used the methods described in Section III-B to evaluate
the origin resilience of each Tor-related AS.
Since Tor clients are not evenly distributed across all ASes
on the Internet, so we also consider and evaluate the resilience
of only ASes that contain Tor guard relays from 95 top Tor
client ASes [7] as the target set of source ASes. Furthermore,
since Tor clients select relays in a bandwidth-weighted manner,
so we also evaluate resilience weighted by Tor bandwidth of
the ASes.
Algorithm 2 Origin-source resilience to interceptions for Tor-
related ASes from a source AS v.
function CALCINTERCEPTRESILIENCE(graph G, node v)
CALCPATHSFROMNODE(G, v)
R[t] = 0 ∀ Tor AS t
for each reachable node i from node v do
if node i contains Tor relays then
n← num. of less preferred nodes than node i
N ← set of more preferred nodes than node i
if existing route v to i is provider route then
N ← N ∩M where M contains all nodes m for
which v to m is provider route
end if
A ← set of equally preferred nodes as node i
if existing route v to i is provider route then
P ← A ∩M where M contains all nodes m for
which v to m is provider route
A ← A−P
end if
R[i]← n+ len(N ) + len(P) +∑a∈A β¯(i, v, a)
end if
end for
N ← num. of nodes in G
return [R[i]/(N − 2) for each node i in R]
end function
Figure 1 shows the CDFs of AS resilience distribution for:
(i) all Tor-related ASes with target set of source ASes being all
ASes; (ii) all Tor-related ASes weighted by the accumulative
Tor bandwidth of each AS, with target set being all ASes;
(iii) all Tor Guard ASes with target set being top 95 Tor client
ASes; (iv) all Tor Guard ASes weighted by bandwidth, with
target set being top 95 Tor client ASes.
Fig. 1: Hijack Resilience for Tor-related ASes.
Interpreting the hijack resilience. All the four curves
show high heterogeneity among AS resiliences. Let us first
consider the two unweighted curves for all Tor ASes and only
Guard ASes. They have almost identical distribution. Among
them, about 20% of the ASes have high resiliences > 0.61,
indicating that in a hijack event, the averaged probability of
a Tor client (who uses relays in the ASes) being deceived is
smaller than 39%. However, there are also 20% of the ASes
with low resiliences < 0.32. The two weighted curves show
some differences: they both have a steep jump at roughly 20%
point first, and then another jump at 30% and 40% points,
respectively. This is due to two high-bandwidth ASes: i)
Fig. 2: Hijack Resilience and Corresponding Bandwidth per
AS. OVH and S.A.S are clear outliers.
AS12876 (ONLINE S.A.S), with resilience 0.4 from all source
ASes (corresponding to the 20% point in the all-ASes curve)
and resilience 0.39 from top Tor client ASes (corresponding
to the 20% point in the top-client curve); ii) AS16276 (OVH),
with resilience 0.41 from all source ASes (corresponding to
the 30% point in the all-ASes curve) and resilience 0.49 from
top Tor client ASes (corresponding to the 40% point in the
top-client curve). Figure 2 plots resilience versus bandwidth
per Tor AS. We can see clearly the two outliers OVH and
ONLINE S.A.S. - high bandwidth, yet low resilience.
The results lead to two question we want to answer: (i) why
do some ASes (e.g., OVH) have relatively lower resiliences
than others?, and (ii) since the origin resilience for an AS
represents the averaged probability across its clients of being
resilient to hijacks, can some of its clients still have high
origin-source resiliences even though the origin resilience is
low?
Analyzing low resilience values of ASes. To answer the
first question, we choose AS16276 (OVH) as an example
and conduct a deeper analysis on it. OVH’s relatively lower
resilience is due to its topological features in the AS hierarchy,
shown in Figure 3. OVH has 4 provider ASes (which are all
tier-1 ASes), and it also has quite a number of peer ASes, while
only having one customer AS (which is a stub AS). Since OVH
only has one customer (AS 35540), so this lone customer AS
is the only AS that is guaranteed to remain unaffected in a
prefix hijack attack (while for other ASes, the impact depends
on their location). For instance, if the hijacking AS is the
customer of a peer AS of OVH, then all other customers of
the particular peer AS will be affected, and even customers of
other peer ASes may also stand a chance of being affected,
while the four Tier 1 ASes will stay unaffected. Thus, if a Tor
client is located in AS 35540 (OVH’s only customer), then
selecting a Tor guard relay in OVH will largely eliminate the
chance of being affected by attacks on OVH and result in
perfect resilience of value 1.
Fig. 3: Partial AS Graph containing OVH.
Heterogeneity in resilience across clients. To answer the
second question, we plot the CDF of origin-source resilience
distribution of each source/client AS for the top 2 ASes with
highest Tor bandwidth (AS16276 and AS12876), as shown in
Figure 4a. The weighted resilience curve represents the origin-
source resilience for each source AS averaged over all Tor
ASes (weighted by each AS’ Tor bandwidth). Both AS17276
and AS12876 exhibit significantly higher heterogeneity com-
pared to the weighted resilience. Thus, we can see that OVH
can be a very non-resilient AS for certain sources AS, while
being resilient for some others (e.g., OVH has origin-source
resiliences >= 0.8 for roughly 20% of the source ASes.)
Similarly, Figure 4b shows the results of top 95 Tor Client
ASes as source ASes, and the weighted curve only considers
Tor Guard ASes. Again, we see greater heterogeneity in
origin-source resiliences for both ASes than in the averaged
case. Interestingly, AS12876 (ONLINE S.A.S) have lower
resiliences than AS16276 (OVH) across all clients. This is
also consistent with the results in Figure 1, in which OVH
has resilience 0.49 compared to ONLINE S.A.S’s 0.39.
E. Interception Resilience Results
Using Tier-1 ASes as intercepting ASes. Tier-1 ASes play
an important role in Internet routing. They sit at the top level
of the Internet hierarchy and carry a large amount of network
traffic. Tier-1 ASes do not have any providers and are all
fully peered with each other. Recall from Section III-C that in
order to successfully intercept traffic of a true origin AS, the
false origin AS needs to satisfy a safety condition - it cannot
announce the invalid route to its providers when its existing
route to true origin AS is through a provider route. This
condition puts Tier-1 ASes at a powerful position - Tier-1 ASes
do not have any providers and thus can always announce the
invalid route to all its neighbors (peers/customers), who will
further propagate the announcement down to other ASes in the
Internet hierarchy. On the contrary, ASes that are towards the
bottom of the Internet hierarchy do not have much interception
power. They have limited number of peers/customers, and
most of their outgoing routes are through providers. Therefore,
due to the difference in interception power, we only focus
on measuring interception resilience to Tier-1 ASes as the
attacking AS here instead of all ASes as the attacking AS.
Interception resilience evaluation and results. We used
17 Tier-1 ASes in our evaluation. 1 Same as in the hijack
resilience evaluation, we used the Tor consensus data and
CAIDA AS topology data, both from January 2016. We first
evaluate interception resilience of all Tor-related ASes, as
shown in Figure 5. We can see that the Tor ASes have higher
resiliences to interception attacks than to hijack attacks, with
roughly 50% of the ASes having resilience higher than 0.8.
The intuition behind this is that, even though Tier-1 ASes are
at a position to intercept traffic, they also have longer paths
from ASes that are close to the bottom of the hierarchy, which
may prefer closer ASes with shorter paths instead of taking the
longer paths to reach the Tier-1 ASes. Note that the resilience
values are slightly lower for the Guard ASes (from top Client
ASes) than all Tor ASes (from all source ASes).
The weighted distributions, though, show obviously lower
resiliences, with the 50% point at resilience value 0.6. This is,
again, due to some high bandwidth Tor ASes which have low
resiliences, e.g., AS16276 (OVH) only has resilience of 0.56.
The analysis in Section III-D on OVH’s topological features
in the AS hierarchy can also be applied here to explain its low
resilience.
We also plot the origin-source resilience distributions of
each source/client AS for the Top 2 high bandwidth ASes
(AS16276 and AS12876), as shown in Figure 6. Consistent
with our observations above, the two high bandwidth ASes
have clearly lower origin-source resiliences across most of the
source ASes, which attribute to their low origin resiliences.
Although, as discussed in Section III-D, they may have low re-
siliences for certain source ASes while having high resiliences
for others, as reflected in the figure as well.
Consider resilience when choosing relay. Tor clients
choose relays based on relay bandwidth, and thus high-
bandwidth relays have high chances of being chosen by Tor
users. However, we have shown in this section that equally-
specific attacks are real threats which have already affected
the Tor network in the past, and the current bandwidth-based
relay selection may choose very low-resilience relays for the
clients. Therefore, guard relay selection that solely relies on
relay bandwidth can expose many Tor users to the high risk of
being compromised by active BGP attacks. This vulnerability
motivates our work on incorporating AS resilience into guard
relay selection, which we will delve into in Section IV.
IV. PROACTIVE DEFENSE:
TOR GUARD RELAY SELECTION
Guard relays are at an important position in the Tor circuit,
since they have direct connections with Tor clients. Strategic
adversaries can discover the users using specific guard relays
via BGP hijacks, and even perform traffic correlation analysis
to deanonymize users via BGP interceptions [8]. The attacks
1AS174, AS209, AS286, AS701, AS1239, AS1299, AS2828, AS2914,
AS3257, AS3320, AS3356, AS5511, AS6453, AS6461, AS6762, AS7018,
AS12956
(a) Hijack Resilience from All Source ASes (b) Hijack Resilience from Top Client ASes
Fig. 4: Hijack Resiliences for Top-Bandwidth ASes across Different Clients.
Fig. 5: Interception Resilience for Tor-related ASes
can be either more-specific prefix attacks or equally-specific
prefix attacks. While more-specific prefix attacks affect the
whole internet and mitigating such attacks could require
cooperations from relay operators (e.g., moving relays into
/24 prefix length), equally-specific prefix attacks affect a
portion of internet, and Tor clients can possibly stay unaffected
during such attacks by choosing the guard relay wisely and
proactively before any attack happens. In addition, as shown
in Section III-A, equally-specific prefix attacks are real threats
that have already affected Tor users in the past. To this end,
we propose a new Tor guard relay selection algorithm that
incorporates AS resilience to minimize the probability that Tor
clients would be affected when their guard relays are under
equally-specific prefix attacks.
The following are the design goals of our guard relay
selection algorithm.
1) Mitigate equally-specific prefix attacks on Tor. This is
the main goal of the selection algorithm. The algorithm
computes the AS resilience against prefix hijacks of all
Tor guard relays from the client source AS, and prefers
the ones that have higher resilience to minimize the
likelihood that the client would be affected by a prefix
hijack on its guard relay.
2) Protect the anonymity of Tor clients. In addition to
lowering the possibilities of being hijacked, the algorithm
should also protect the anonymity of Tor users by balanc-
ing preferences among relays and providing rigorously
assessed anonymity bounds.
3) Performance and load balancing. The algorithm should
incorporate relay bandwidth into the selection decision
and avoid causing excessive traffic congestion on low
bandwidth relays.
A. Guard Relay Selection Algorithm
We describe our Tor guard relay selection algorithm in detail
with regards to two aspects: 1) choosing resilience metric and
2) incorporating resilience into relay selection.
1) Choosing Resilience Metric: In general, ASes are more
resilient to interception attacks than to hijack attacks, as shown
in Section III. The interception resilience is a conservative
measure of the probability of intercepting packets without
additional set ups (e.g., VPN tunnels that send packets to
the origin, or tunneling to a colluding AS which can then
forward packets to the origin, etc.). However, there could be
many cases where the probability of intercepting is higher.
In other words, the interception resilience provides a upper
bound on resilience to packet interception. On the contrary,
the hijack resilience considers a basic property that any packet
interception needs to satisfy, and hence provides a lower bound
on resilience to packet interception. For this reason, we will
choose the hijack resilience to incorporate into the guard relay
selection.
2) Incorporating resilience: We defined the origin-source
resilience in Section III-B, which represents the probability of
a given source AS being resilient to attacks on a true origin
AS. Here, the source AS is the AS where Tor client is located,
and the true origin ASes are the ones which contain eligible
Tor guard relays. Algorithm 1 describes how to calculate the
origin-source resilience R(i) of each Tor-related AS i from
the client AS v.
Tor relay selection is bandwidth-aware and prefers high
bandwidth relays. The probability of each relay i being chosen
is based on its default bandwidth B(i). We offer a tunable
parameter α in the relay selection algorithm, combining hijack
(a) Interception Resilience from All Source ASes (b) Interception Resilience from Top Client ASes
Fig. 6: Interception Resilience for Top-Bandwidth ASes across Different Clients.
resilience R(i) and the default bandwidth B(i). Each relay i
will be assigned a weight as following:
W (i) = α×R(i) + (1− α)× ¯B(i)
Note that, B(i) is normalized to ¯B(i), which is in [0, 1].
when α is set to 0, the relay selection becomes the same
as bandwidth-only selection; while when α is set to 1, the
selection becomes resilience-only selection.
3) Randomization is needed: If we simply select the set
of guard relays based on the probability of W (i)/
∑
W (i),
an adversary can potentially run a relay that has an AS-level
path with high local preferences and/or short path length to
the Tor client, such that it has high resilience from the client
AS as the source. Via this attack, an adversary obtains a
high probability of being chosen. Furthermore, the Tor client
might also be susceptible to fingerprinting attacks due to the
differences in relay selection probabilities based on the AS-
location of the client. An adversary that can observe the client
for a long enough time may be able to infer the AS-location of
the client based on its observed relay selection choices. Thus,
we need to take into account these potential vulnerabilities
and protect the anonymity of clients. Recall that the weight
of a Tor relay depends on two components: (1) the resilience
of the AS in which the relay is located, and (2) the relay’s
bandwidth. The relay’s bandwidth is not specific to client
locations, and thus would not reveal any client identities; in
addition, due to resource constraints, it is not trivial to run a
relay with significantly higher bandwidth than all other relays
to obtain high probability of being chosen. On the other hand,
AS resilience of relays is client-specific, and requires much
less resource to run a malicious relay with high AS resilience.
Instead of using resilience R(i) for relay i directly in the
weight calculation, we first adjust it to R(i)′ by calculating
the estimated inclusion probability of the relay in a random
sampling of size (g · N) using the algorithm proposed by
Tille [28]. Here, N corresponds to the total number of Tor
guard relays, and g is a configurable parameter indicating
the percentage of random sampling we want to perform. The
intuition behind using Tille’s algorithm is that we want to first
pick (g · N) relays based on R(i), and then randomly pick
one among the selected relays. Tille’s algorithm provides an
estimation of the probability of a relay being chosen given its
R(i). The steps are as following:
1) For each relay i, R(i)′ = k·R(i)∑
j∈S R(j)
in which k is initially
equal to the sample size (g·N) and set S initially includes
all available relays.
2) For each relay i, if R(i)′ > 1, R(i)′ = 1 and k = k − 1,
and exclude relay i from set S.
3) Repeat the above process until each R(i)′ is in [0, 1].
4) For each relay i, R(i)′ = R(i)
′
g·N
Note that when g is set to 1N , then no random sampling will
be performed, while if g is set to 1, then all relays will have
the same R(i)′ in their weights.
B. Implementation on Tor
Mapping the IP addresses of the Tor client and the Tor relays
to their respective AS is necessary before we can compute AS
resilience. In order to preserve the anonymity of the Tor client
and not reveal its location to outside servers or anyone who
can observe its communications, the client will perform the
IP to ASN mapping locally by utilizing the Maxmind ASN
database [29], which can be included in the Tor download
package. Note that the Maxmind GeoIP database for IP to
Country mapping is already included in the Tor package and
being used by the vanilla Tor client. In addition, the client will
use the AS topology database from CAIDA [30] (< 700KB
compressed) for AS-level path inference in the resilience
calculation. Here, we assume that Maxmind GeoIP database
and CAIDA AS topology database are both reliable sources.
Note that, CAIDA only updates the AS topology database
monthly, so the overhead incurred for downloading the most
recent file is low. The detailed steps are as following:
1) If the Maxmind ASN file and AS topology file have not
been downloaded, the Tor client will download the two
files from Maxmind and CAIDA, respectively, and save
them in the local data directory. Otherwise, the Tor client
will check if the local AS topology file is up to date
(updated monthly), and if not, then download the latest
version.
2) The Tor client will perform IP to ASN mapping, and
compute the AS resilience R(i) of all candidate guard
relays from the client AS as the source AS.
3) The Tor client will perform random sampling on all
candidate guard relays and adjust the resilience value to
R(i)′.
4) The Tor client will compute a weight for each candidate
relay using formula W (i) = α×R(i)′+ (1−α)× ¯B(i).
5) The Tor client will proceed with the path selection. The
remaining part of the circuit construction process stays
the same as it is in Tor.
C. Security and Anonymity Evaluation
We evaluate the security and anonymity of the Tor guard re-
lay selection algorithm from three perspectives: (1) increasing
the probability of a Tor client being resilient (unaffected) to a
hijack attack on the Tor guard relay, (2) vulnerability to client
fingerprinting attacks, and (3) rigorously assessing anonymity
bound for a given Tor client using MATor [14].
1) Probability of a Tor client being resilient to a hijack
attack on Tor guard relay: This is the main goal of the new
relay selection algorithm. Let Ppick(i) denote the probability
that a Tor client will choose relay i using our algorithm,
and Presilient(i) denote the probability that a Tor client will
stay unaffected if relay i is being hijacked. Presilient(i) is
essentially the same as the origin-source resilience described
in Section III-B. The aggregated probability of a Tor client
being resilient to a hijack attack on guard relay can then be
expressed as: ∑
i∈{all guard relays}
Ppick(i) ∗ Presilient(i)
We evaluate the probability for five values of α =
{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, using 95 top Tor client ASes [7] as
the source ASes and Tor consensus data from January 2016.
Figure 7 shows the result. Naturally, α = 1 has the highest
probability of being resilient by an attack, with an average of
36% increase. Note that, the algorithm benefits certain clients
more than the others. For instance, if a client already has high
probability of being resilient under the current relay selection
algorithm, then its space for improvement would be low, as
shown in Figure 7.
We then evaluate it with random sampling of g = 10%. We
choose 10% as the random factor here based on empirical
evaluations of different g values, and we found that the
marginal benefit of a larger g value does not compensate the
loss in resilience to hijack attacks and performance.
Table II shows the average relative percentage of improve-
ment in the probability of being resilient to a hijack attack
compared to α = 0, for both with and without random
sampling. We can see that, even though the highest average is
36%, the maximum percentage can be up to 166% for certain
clients. Also, there is only a slight decrease in percentage
of improvement for higher α values with the 10% random
sampling.
Fig. 7: Probability of being resilient to attacks with different
α values
α Average
(No
sampling)
Average
(10%
sampling)
Maximum
(No
sampling)
Maximum
(10%
sampling)
0.25 27% 22% 114% 93%
0.5 32% 30% 144% 131%
0.75 35% 34% 158% 153%
1 36% 36% 166% 166%
TABLE II: Percentage of improvement in resilience compared
to α = 0
2) Vulnerability to client fingerprinting attacks: There is a
potential security tradeoff in the relay selection algorithm be-
tween vulnerability to prefix hijack attacks and vulnerability to
fingerprinting attacks. We briefly discussed in Section IV-A3
about fingerprinting a client location based on its preferences
of relays in the long term. For instance, for a given relay, if
client a has 70% probability of choosing the relay while client
b only has 30% probability, then an adversary can observe the
client’s choice of relays over time to infer client information.
The resilience component of our relay selection algorithm
may be subject to such fingerprinting attacks, which we will
evaluate here.
We used an entropy-based anonymity metric, Shannon
Entropy [31], to evaluate the information leak. This metric
considers the distribution of potential Tor clients of the connec-
tion (as computed by the attacker) and computes its Shannon
entropy as:
HShannon(I) = −
∑
i
pilog2pi
where pi is the probability that for the given relay, client i
is the initiator of the connection. We consider the top 95 Tor
client ASes [7] as potential clients, and focus on guard relays.
Note that, the maximum entropy that can be achieved will be
log2 95 = 6.57.
Table III shows the result. Bandwidth-only selection in
Vanilla Tor (α = 0) has maximum entropy 6.57 for all relays,
since the probability of it being chosen is the same across
all clients, and thus does not leak any client information.
With resilience-based selection, the entropy becomes lower.
However, the loss in entropy is not significant - with 2.4% loss
when α = 0.25, and 4.1% loss when α = 1. With the 10%
random sampling, this loss is further reduced down to 1.7%
loss when α = 0.25, and 3.9% when α = 1. Furthermore,
since Tor clients only select guard relays at bootstrapping
time and would then use the same guard relays over several
months (or until the relays become unavailable), so precise
fingerprinting could not be done in a reasonably short time
(without launching massive DoS attacks which cause guard
relays to become unavailable). Especially given the very minor
loss in entropy as shown in Table III, the attacker will not be
able to efficiently locate client ASes. Additionally, there could
be hundreds of thousands or millions of clients in an AS, so
even knowing the client AS still does not imply precise client
information.
α Entropy (No
sampling)
Percentage
Reduction
Entropy
(10%
Sampling)
Percentage
Reduction
0 6.57 - - -
0.25 6.41 2.4% 6.46 1.7%
0.5 6.36 3.2% 6.39 2.7%
0.75 6.32 3.8% 6.35 3.3%
1 6.3 4.1% 6.31 3.9%
TABLE III: Average Shannon Entropy. Note that when α = 0,
entropy reaches maximum value of 6.57, indicating a com-
pletely uniform distribution.
Recommended setting of α value. We can see from Figure
7 that α = {0.75, 1} does not have a significant advantage in
increasing resilience over α = {0.5} in Section IV-C1. Thus,
we recommend using α = 0.5 as default, since it provides an
obviously greater increase in resilience to attacks than α =
0.25, while the marginal benefit decreases as α continues to
increase. α = 0.5 also offers a relatively higher entropy (and
thus lower vulnerability to fingerprinting attacks) compared to
bigger α values, as shown in Table III. However, if the Tor
client has some special configurations (e.g., clean up cached
circuits and connect to new guards frequently instead of using
the default guard relay configuration), then she should consider
using a lower α value. In Section IV-D, we will show that
α = 0.5 provides good performance as well.
3) Anonymity assessment: Finally, we evaluate the
anonymity of a given Tor client using MATor, a framework
for assessing the degree of anonymity in Tor with rigorously
proved anonymity bounds [14]. Note that the anonymity notion
in MATor is different from that in Section IV-C2: MATor
considers a given client and measures anonymity with different
relays that may be chosen by this given client, while the
latter considers a given relay and measures the entropy in the
probabilities of it being chosen by different clients.
We implemented and integrated our new guard relay selec-
tion algorithm into MATor, and evaluated it in comparison
with vanilla Tor. Note that we picked the top Tor client
location AS6128 [32] to evaluate here. We used MATor’s
default configuration of multiplicative factor  = 1.3, ports
setting of HTTPS+IRC vs. HTTPS, and 0.5% of total nodes
as compromised nodes (considering a worst-case adversary
with a limit on the number of nodes it can compromise). We
evaluated using Tor consensus files from 2/1/2016 - 2/9/2016
and server descriptor from February 2016. Figure 8 shows
the result.
Fig. 8: MATor Anonymity Bound 2/1/2016 - 2/9/2016
MATor evaluates three anonymity notions (sender, recipient,
and relationship anonymity). The full details of the anonymity
definitions are described in [14]. The result shows that our
new guard relay selection algorithm has tighter anonymity
bounds on sender and relationship anonymities compared
to current Tor path selection, indicating better anonymity
guarantees. The recipient anonymity remains the same as
vanilla Tor, which is expected since we do not alter selection
algorithm for exit relays. The intuition behind the better
anonymity provided by our algorithm is that we redistribute the
preferences for guard relays by factoring in relay resiliences.
This avoids placing high trust in a small set of high-bandwidth
nodes, and thus results in better anonymity.
D. Performance Evaluation
We implemented our new Tor guard relay selection al-
gorithm by modifying Tor’s source code, and evaluate on
the Shadow emulator [33] for large scale and whole system
network performance. We configured the Tor network in our
simulation as in Table IV. Note that, this is the default
configuration that comes with the Shadow Tor plug-in, which
has been fine tuned by Shadow developers to model the Tor
network.
Type Number
Web Client 360
Bulk Client 40
Web Server 100
Guard Relay 14
Exit Relay 10
Guard/Exit Relay 5
Middle Relay 66
TABLE IV: Shadow Configuration
Since our relay selection is location-dependent, we need to
assign meaningful IP addresses to all the nodes. We used the
(a) 60 second average receiving throughput for all nodes. (b) 60 second average sending throughput for all nodes.
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(d) Download time for 5MB data.
Fig. 9: Large-scale evaluation of Tor guard selection algorithm on Shadow simulator.
IP addresses in the default Shadow configuration file for the
relays, and we uniformly chose IP addresses from the 95 top
Tor client locations [7] to the 400 Tor clients in our simulation.
For simplicity, we only show the results for α = 0.5 here in
comparison to Vanilla Tor.
Figure 9 shows the network performance results from the
emulation. Figure 9a and Figure 9b shows the 60 second aver-
age receiver and sender throughput for all nodes, respectively.
Counter-Raptor selection has almost the same throughput as
Vanilla Tor during the simulation, while having two oscilla-
tions in the middle. Figure 9c shows the download times of
320KB data. We can see that Counter-Raptor and Vanilla Tor
have identical performance. Figure 9d shows the download
times of 5MB data. For this much larger data size, there is a
minor increase in latency.
As briefly explained in this Section, we do not restrict relay
selection to a smaller set of relays and we give sufficient
weight to the bandwidth (α = 0.5 here), which explain
why our new guard selection algorithm only suffers minor
performance loss compared to Vanilla Tor.
V. REACTIVE DEFENSE:
BGP MONITORING SYSTEM
The Tor guard relay selection algorithm in Section IV
proactively mitigates the affect of active BGP hijacks on the
Tor client. In this section, we present a live BGP monitoring
system that reactively detects suspicious routing attacks that
affect Tor relays. While there have been previously proposed
BGP monitoring systems to detect prefix hijack attacks [34]–
[39], our system is the first that has been tailored for the Tor
network. We introduce a novel analytics-based approach for
hijack detection, which is specifically designed and tuned for
Tor. Our live monitoring system increases routing transparency
in the Tor network. Attackers will have to perform attacks in
the public domain, as opposed to being stealthy.
Some relay operators have expressed interest in receiving
alerts from our system upon routing anomaly detection on their
relays. This would be beneficial to relay operators as it would
allow them to mitigate any attack much quicker than without
the use of our system. Therefore, fewer Tor users would be
affected by the hijack because the attack would last a shorter
amount of time. Additionally, Tor users and others can also
subscribe to our system to receive alerts. This could be helpful
to Tor users by not only increasing the transparency in the Tor
network, but also allowing them to select relays that are not
being hijacked (in the case that they do not follow the default
Tor settings, and select the relays they use). Our system will
be available to both relay operators and Tor users (or any
subscriber) when we make our system publicly available.
A. System Design
a) Collecting Monitoring Data: A BGP monitoring sys-
tem on Tor requires information about current Tor relays.
The Tor Project releases up-to-date information about current
running relays every hour. Our system automatically fetches
this consensus data2. We focus on Tor guard relays and exit
relays, which reside at the two ends of the communication
path and can easily be the target of an adversary. Furthermore,
since we focus on AS-level adversaries, it is unnecessary to
monitor each individual relay by its IP address. Instead, we
monitor the /24 prefixes which contain Tor guard and exit
relays. There is no need to monitor a more specific prefix
than /24, since generally /24 is the longest prefix accepted in
a BGP announcement.
We pull a live stream of BGP announcements and with-
drawals from BGPStream [15], an open source framework for
live BGP data. We filter the BGP data to focus on the prefixes
that contain a Tor guard or exit relay, as well as all the sub-
prefixes up to the length /24 in order to detect sub-prefix (a.k.a
more-specific prefix) hijack attacks.
We use IP to ASN mappings from Team Cymru [40]
to obtain AS ownerships of the prefixes that contain Tor
guard/exit relays. Some prefixes are owned by an organization
with multiple AS numbers, so we take this into consideration
and store all AS origins of these prefixes. One caveat of using
Team Cymru is the potential inaccuracy and incompleteness of
the data; the system could also be augmented to check multiple
registries and compare results.
b) Detecting Routing Anomalies: We develop a frame-
work for hijack detection, which utilizes two different types of
techniques to check if any BGP activity involving Tor relays
is anomalous, as following:
1) Origin AS check. We compare the origin AS in the live
BGP data against the owner AS in the Team Cymru
registry in real-time. If there is a mismatch, we flag the
BGP update and the prefix as suspicious.
2) Analytics-based detection. We use two novel detection
analytics based on the frequency and time features of
BGP updates; because there is a significantly smaller
2https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/consensuses/
number of updates that include a Tor relay in comparison
to all BGP updates, this analytics-based approach is
effective for Tor, and produces a more reasonable amount
of false positives (as discussed in further sections). If a
BGP update for a prefix falls under the tuned threshold
of either analytics, we flag the BGP update and prefix as
suspicious.
a) Frequency Analytic. Routing attacks can be character-
ized by an AS announcing a path once (or extremely
rarely) to a prefix that it does not own. The frequency
analytic detects attacks that exhibit this behavior. It
measures the frequency of each AS that originates a
given prefix; if the frequency is below some threshold,
then it could be a potential hijack attack.
b) Time analytic. Many real-world attacks last a rela-
tively short amount of time in comparison to life span
of a prefix [17], [20], [21], [41]. The time analytic
measures the amount of time each path to a prefix is
announced for; if the amount of time is below some
threshold, then there is the possibility of it being a
routing attack.
We select the threshold values for the frequency and time
analytics, respectively, by evaluating the system detection
accuracy on historical BGP data with known attacks.
c) Mitigating Hijack Attacks: Once a suspicious update
is flagged by a combination of techniques in the framework,
the relay(s) that are contained in the flagged (potentially
hijacked) prefix are blacklisted. Relays that are blacklisted
should not be used as guards for a period of time. Our
system can detect when a route to the victim prefix has
returned to normal, and will remove the prefix from the
blacklist at that point. This provides some attack mitigation
by preventing use of the guard when it could potentially be
hijacked. Additionally, this design does not force relays to be
blacklisted forever, and relays can be used once deemed safe
again.
B. Deployment and Data Analysis
The BGP monitoring system has been running since Febru-
ary 1st, 2016. In this section, we analyze the data for the
whole month of February, and tune the threshold values for
the frequency and time analytics. The threshold is calculated
based on all BGP updates for the month of February that
include a prefix that contains at least one Tor relay. We tune
the threshold on an entire month worth of data because any
potential attack in the data is a source of pollution; an attack
is less likely to stand out as anomalous in a small amount of
data as compared to a larger amount of data, such as a months
worth of data. In Sections V-C and V-D we apply these tuned
threshold values to the months of March, April and May of
2016. Therefore, data collected in February serves as training
data, and data collected in March, April, and May serves as
test data.
During the month of February, we assume there were no
hijack attacks that affected the Tor network, and therefore
assume there are no attacks in our monitored data from the
month. Our detection analytics are run in real-time on an
hourly basis in addition to analyzing the results of the real-
time origin AS check for two purposes: 1) threshold tuning,
and 2) false positive analysis. We present the data analysis
results of each detection method according to the framework
described in Section V-A.
Origin AS Check. This checking is done in real time as
the live BGP stream comes into our system. We compare the
origin AS from the BGP announcement in the live data stream
with the owner AS of the prefix from Team Cymru registry.
If there is a mismatch, then we log the prefix and the origin
AS from the BGP announcement. Table V shows the result.
From Table V, we can see that the total number of BGP
updates with mismatching origin AS is large in comparison to
the number of unique prefixes in these mismatching cases,
with an even smaller number of unique ASes involved in
these prefixes. There are many duplicate BGP updates over
time, which will all cause an alert in the system; future work
includes implementing a known “benign” set of (prefix, origin
AS) pairs, such that duplicates do not trigger an additional
alert. Additionally, if we know that a “mismatch” AS origin
is indeed authorized to make the announcement for the prefix
(e.g., we may get this information from relay operators), then
we can add this exception to our “benign” list so that it would
not trigger an alert again when it sees the same announcement.
Furthermore, we may be more interested to know how many
new mismatches occur (rather than the frequently recurring
ones), which may not be anomalous since routing attacks
usually last for a short time and do not exhibit a repeated
pattern over a long period of time. For example, there were
164 unique mismatching prefixes in March and 79 unique
ASes involved with the prefixes, but many of these mismatches
also appeared in February. If we calculate the number of
new mismatching prefixes that appeared in March (but not in
February), the number goes down to 55 unique prefixes and 25
unique ASes. Additionally, while more than a hundred prefixes
may appear to be a large number of alerts, it is important to
remember that it is the total number of alerts for an entire
month, which averages to just a few alerts per day. To further
reduce the number of false positives, the origin AS check can
be combined with the new analytics.
Frequency Analytic. The frequency analytic is calculated
in real-time, automatically once per hour; this time increment
can be reduced from hourly to a per-minute basis. For our
data analysis, and to tune the threshold value, we applied
this analytic to the data from the month of February, with
varying threshold values. The threshold value corresponds to
the ratio of (total number of times a given prefix is announced
by a given AS)/(total number of times a given prefix is
announced by all ASes). As we expected, the number of false
positives is directly related to the threshold value that is set
for the analytic; the higher the threshold value, the more false
positives are reported. On the other hand, setting the threshold
value too low can cause false negatives (actual attacks that are
not detected).
We varied the threshold value from 0.000 to 0.004. The
false positive rate remained at 0% until the threshold value was
raised to 0.003, at which point it became 0.05%. Therefore, we
select a threshold value of 0.0025 for the frequency analytic
when we apply the analytic to future (test) data.
Time Analytic. Similar to tuning the threshold value of the
frequency analytic, we tuned the threshold of time analytic
using the data collected throughout February. We applied
the time analytic while varying threshold values in order to
determine the optimal threshold.
We varied the threshold from 0.00 to 0.08. The false positive
rate remains at 0% until the threshold value is raised to 0.07,
at which point it became 0.05%. Therefore, the threshold value
for the time analytic is 0.065, which will be used in our
evaluation on data from March, April, and May.
C. Evaluation: Simulated Attacks
After tuning threshold values for our detection analytics, we
evaluate our monitoring system by testing these values on data
collected by the system during the months of March, April, and
May. Our evaluation should measure: 1) how accurately the
detection mechanisms can detect attacks, and 2) how usable is
the system (in terms of false positive rate), given that it alerts
a subscriber when attacks are detected. To measure this, we
analyzed past real-world hijack attacks, and modeled simulated
attacks after them. These simulated attacks were injected in
the off-line data that our monitoring system recorded. When
deciding which prefix to hijack, we randomly selected a prefix
already contained in the monitoring data, and we used the false
origin associated with the real-world hijack. All attacks are
equally-specific hijack attacks, as more-specific prefix hijack
attack detection has previously been studied [26], [34], [36],
[39]. The following are brief descriptions of the real-world
attacks after which the simulations are modeled.
1) Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE) hijack
in 2014 [21]. We injected 3 BGP updates into our
data to make it appear that an attack occurred for four
minutes on March 23, 2016. The hijacked prefix was
185.15.244.0/22, and it was an equal-length prefix hijack
attack.
2) Korean Weather Service hijacked US Climatic Center
(climate.gov) in 2014 [22]. We injected 10 BGP updates
into the March 30th-31st data for hijack that lasted 25
hours. The hijacked prefix was 103.56.207.0/24.
3) Windstream hijacked a SaudiNet prefix in 2014 [22]. We
injected 2 updates in the March 31st data to represent a
1 hour hijack of prefix 104.37.192.0/24.
4) Windstream hijacked a Hadara Gaza prefix in 2014 [22].
To model this attack, we hijacked prefix 195.254.135.0/24
on April 30th for 8 hours. We injected an update once
per hour for a total of 8 updates.
5) Windstream hijacked of Advania Iceland prefix in
2014 [22]. We injected 9 updates over the course of 9
hours on April 30th to hijack prefix 89.187.128.0/19. The
malicious BGP announcements had a shorter path than
the true announcements.
Month Total # of Tor
Updates
Total # of Ori-
gin AS Conflict
Updates
# of Unique
Prefixes in
Conflicts
# of Unique
ASes in
Conflicts
# of Total
Unique
Prefixes
# of Total
Unique Origin
ASes
February 1401633 84148 139 71 2195 837
March 1077098 49025 164 79 2357 858
April 1691325 326586 369 88 2453 859
May 2403680 22267 79 52 1954 783
TABLE V: Summary statistics for conflicting origin AS updates.
6) Windstream hijacked two China Telecom prefixes in
2014 [22]. We modeled these two attacks separately on
April 30th by injecting 9 updates over 9 hours for prefixes
77.245.144.0/20 and 151.100.0.0/16.
7) INEA S.A. hijacked a US Department of Defense prefix
in 2014 [22]. This attack was simulated by injecting 2
updates on April 30th for prefix 107.181.174.0/24 for a
total time of 17 minutes.
8) A2B Internet hijacked a network associated with Bitcoin
in 2015 [23]. We injected 4 updates on May 14th an-
nouncing prefix 193.200.241.0/24 for an attack that lasted
11 hours.
Table VI shows the summary statistics and characteristics
for the attacks that were injected into the March, April, and
May data.
After simulating the real-world attacks, we apply our detec-
tion mechanisms hourly and evaluate them for false positives
and false negatives. We discuss the accuracy and coverage of
each defense mechanism individually.
Origin AS Check. The origin AS check successfully detects
all of the injected attacks, since they all triggered the mis-
matching AS origin. Similar to the results presented in Section
V-B, this check produces a large number of false positives,
but the false positive rate can be reduced by analyzing unique
origin ASes or unique prefixes being announced. The system
can retain a list of known, non-malicious (prefix, origin AS)
pairs, such that duplicates do not trigger an alert. Additionally,
this check can be combined with the frequency and time
analytics for a more precise set of alerts. If either the frequency
or time analytic also flag the (prefix, origin AS) pair, then the
user is alerted to the potentially malicious update.
Frequency analytic. We applied the frequency analytic in
real-time to each hour in March, April, and May, with a
threshold value of .0025 (as determined in Section V-B). The
frequency of AS A announcing prefix P was calculated based
on the previous month of data for the hour being analyzed.
For example, the first hour of April was analyzed with respect
to the frequencies in the month of March.
This analytic was able to detect all attacks described in
Table VI, and therefore produced 0 false negatives. Each attack
was detected within the first hour of the first announcement;
for attacks that lasted longer than a single hour, the attacks
were still flagged in subsequent hours.
A common issue with monitoring and detection systems is
the amount of false positives produced. If the false positive
rate is too high, then the system is unusable. The frequency
analytic produced very few false positives; on average, over
the 2,616 hours monitored, the false positive rate was .38%.
We saw that 99.9% of the hours monitored produced 0 false
positives.
The results for the frequency analytic highlight an impor-
tant characteristic about the Tor network: most prefixes are
announced by a single AS in all updates, causing the frequency
of the (prefix, origin AS) pair to most commonly be 1.0. This
suggests that this analytic is suitable for use in monitoring
BGP activities on Tor.
Time Analytic. We applied the time analytic with the
threshold value of .065 (determined in Section V-B) to every
hour of data in March, April, and May. As with the frequency
analytic, the timing information of announcements in the
current were analyzed with respect to the previous month’s
timing information.
In terms of false negatives, the time analytic detected all
of the simulated attacks. Similar to the frequency analytic,
the false negative rate was 0. This analytic exhibited a low
percentage of false positives at .19% on average across all
hours monitored. As with the frequency analytic, 99.9% of
the hours in the dataset had 0 false positives.
Again, similar to the frequency analytic, the time analytic
results in very low false positives, indicating that it is also well-
suited for monitoring the Tor network. Both of these analytics
help reduce the false positives produced by the AS check,
while still flagging the true positives.
D. Evaluation: Real-World Attack
In addition to the simulated attacks, we also performed a
real-world BGP hijack attack on prefixes that we owned for
the duration of our experiment. Note that the IP range and AS
number we used to perform hijack attacks were temporarily
subleased to us for our experiment. This was a separate
experimental setup from the simulated attacks presented in
the previous section.
We announced the prefix 184.164.226.0/23, which we tem-
porarily owned, using the PEERING testbed. [42]. It allows us
to establish BGP connectivity with other ASes by proxying our
announcement via dozens of deployed sites in the world. In or-
der to perform the hijack attacks, we used two PEERING sites:
AS2637 (GATECH) and AS226 (ISI). We first announced
the prefix using AS2637, and also added the prefix to the
hourly list of prefixes that contain Tor relays, which is used to
filter out BGP updates that contain Tor relays (as described in
Section V-A). On May 16th, 2016, we performed an equally-
specific prefix hijack for about 5 minutes by announcing the
Attack Month Prefix Hijacking ASN True Origin ASN # of Updates Injected Length of Time of Hijack
1) March 185.15.244.0/22 29256 24961 3 4 minutes
2) March 103.56.207.0/24 10063 58477 10 25 hours
3) March 104.37.192.0/24 7029 36077 2 1 hour
4) April 195.254.135.0/24 7029 38935 8 8 hours
5) April 89.187.128.0/19 7029 35592 9 9 hours
6) April 77.245.144.0/20 7029 42868 9 9 hours
7) April 151.100.0.0/16 7029 137 9 9 hours
8) April 107.181.174.0/24 13110 46562 2 17 minutes
9) May 193.200.241.0/24 51088 51167 4 11 hours
TABLE VI: Summary statistics for the simulated attacks modeled after real-world attacks.
prefix using AS226, which is modeled after a real-world hijack
attack [17], [20], [21], [41]. During the hijack, the origin for
the prefix in some of the BGP announcements became AS226.
All three detection mechanisms – origin AS check, fre-
quency analytic, time analytic – flag this as an attack during
our real-time monitoring and the hourly analytics. While our
attack can detect all the simulated attacks, this shows that it
can also detect real-world attacks.
E. Adversarial Knowledge of Detection Techniques
In order to bypass our analytics detection, the adversary
needs to make the false announcements both i) more frequent
so it will be higher than the frequency analytic threshold,
and ii) for longer time so it will be higher than the time
analytic threshold. These two would be intrinsically hard to
achieve at the same time - routing attacks are usually short,
since the longer/more frequent the attack is, the much less
stealthier it becomes. Especially given that we use the previous
month’s data as the threshold basis, it would be very hard to
overcome. Furthermore, the system will flag the suspicious
announcement the first time it appears, so if more such
suspicious announcements arrive, they would not be used for
the analytics to avoid polluting the data. By actively omitting
subsequent (redundant) attack data, this system can defend
against such strategic poisoning attacks.
VI. DISCUSSION
Accuracy of AS path inference. Part of our AS resilience
calculation involves AS-level path inference from the network
topology. Recent work has shown that path inferences using
local preference and shortest path may not be completely
accurate [43], and thus path selection algorithms [10] that
rely on the accuracy of AS path inferences could be affected.
However, we only use path inference as an indicator of
network connectivity to calculate origin resilience instead
of predicting and replying on any precise routes. Thus, our
resilience calculation is robust to a certain degree of AS path
inference inaccuracy and/or AS path churn.
Reliability of BGPStream. BGPStream aggregates all of
the BGP prefix updates seen by RouteViews and RIPE collec-
tors. If some set of the collectors are manipulated or corrupted,
the other collectors can still be used and the monitoring
system will still be effective. If the aggregator (BGPStream)
is manipulated or corrupted, data can still be verified against
the collectors through RouteViews or RIPE, and the original
data can be restored and analyzed using the analytics in our
system.
Comparing and Combining the Detection Techniques.
As we can see from Section V, the origin AS check is success-
ful at catching the hijack attacks (true positives), while result-
ing in a significant number of false positives. We discussed two
potential ways of eliminating false positives in Section V-B,
which include getting input from relay operators and marking
certain prefix announcements as ”benign”, as well as focusing
on new mismatching cases rather than recurring ones. We can
combine the origin AS check with our frequency and time
analytics to achieve even higher accuracy. In contrast to the
origin AS check, the analytics-based detection methods result
in low false positive rates, which are used as an additional filter
on the alerts triggered by the origin AS check to eliminate false
positives.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented proactive and reactive
countermeasures to safeguard Tor against active BGP routing
attacks. First, we evaluated the Tor network for its current
state of resilience to hijack and interception attacks. We
observed that some ASes with high Tor bandwidth have
relatively low resilience. Next, we presented a new Tor guard
relay selection algorithm that proactively mitigates routing
attacks. The algorithm successfully increases the probability
of a Tor client being resilient to prefix hijack attacks. Finally,
we presented a live monitoring system that uses multiple new
detection mechanisms to alert subscribers to potential hijack
attacks happening in real-time. We evaluated the monitoring
system, and found that it was able to detect simulated attacks
modeled after real-world attacks, as well as a real hijack
attack (performed by us), with a negligible false positive rate.
Overall, our work is the first work on proactively mitigating
active routing attacks on Tor, and the first on presenting a
real-time monitoring system tailored for Tor.
Source Code: The source code of Counter-RAPTOR guard
relay selection algorithm is available at https://github.com/
inspire-group/Counter-Raptor-Tor-Client.
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